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FAIR TRIAL-EQUAL IN VALUE TO FREE PRESS
ROBERT G. WECLEW*
HEN Mr. Justice Holmes enunciated the clear and present
danger doctrine in Schenk v. United States' and when Mr.
Justice Sanford subsequently assumed that freedom of speech
and of press were fundamental rights protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment in Gitlo v. New York,' the
foundations were laid for the "free press" portion of the "free press-
fair trial" problem. When newspapers, in a mob-dominated atmos-
phere, daily published inflammatory material, and the defendants' at-
torneys didn't feel free to request a continuance, a change of venue, or
separate trials, the Supreme Court, in Moore v. Dempsey,3 held the
accused were denied due process. Thus, an initial contribution was
made to "fair trial."
In the hierarchy of values first amendment rights forged rapidly
ahead, sometimes within, but usually without, the milieu of a trial
conducted in accordance with due process. The newspapers, maga-
zines, radio and other organs for mass information having more friends
and influence than those accused of crime found a favorable climate
for their opinions and values. In the context of an amendment which
encouraged full and free expression in a democratic society, these
opinions and values gave rise to doctrines that placed the entire con-
tents of the amendment in a special position usually impervious to
assault. The clear and present danger test was reenforced by the
"preferred position" doctrine along with presumptions of invalidity.
The clear and present danger test, the preferred position test, and
presumption of unconstitutionality applied only to first amendment
rights.
* MR. WECLEW is a Professor of Law at De Paul University College of Law. He re-
ceived his ].D. at Northwestern University and is a member of the Illinois Bar.
1 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919): "The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
2 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 3 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
4 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 115 (1943).
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It wasn't until 1932 that the modern law of due process in state
criminal cases began. It was at this time that the defendant was granted
right to counsel and, then, only in the context of specific circum-
stances.6 Specific circumstances determined if fundamental fairness
had been violated, thereby denying a fair trial. It was only by a process
of gradual incorporation that certain of the Bill of Rights became
part of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment as a flat
requirement and as a matter of fundamental right.' First amendment
rights reached a peak in the 1940's. However, the Court even now
continues to reinterpret constitutional principles to give the accused
in criminal cases more favorable treatment.7
The due process clause of the fifth amendment in addition to the
sixth amendment provisions for a speedy and public jury trial, and the
rights of the defendant to know the nature of the accusation, and to
confront any adverse witnesses, as well as the rights to compulsory
process for obtaining favorable witnesses, and assistance of counsel
furnish the constitutional tools for "fair trial." The due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment guarantees a fair trial in cases coming
up from state tribunals.
The first amendment's guarantees of free speech, free press and
the right to petition constitute the elements for "free press." These
rights embodied in the first amendment and the values they represent
come into competition with rights of the fifth and sixth amendment
as well as, in state cases, the fourteenth amendment where criticism,
comment, or information is published before, during, or after a trial.
The Supreme Court may ultimately be called upon to rule how best
to resolve the competing interests of news media and the press, on
the one hand, and society which has a strong interest in the fair ad-
ministration of justice, on the other hand.
THE PROBLEM
The accused is entitled to a trial in accordance with the rules of
evidence, practice and procedure and constitutional law that have
been developed to insure the unfolding of the truth without denying
the rights of the litigants in the adversary system. The news media
5 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6 E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7 E.g., Miranda v. State of Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966 : Statements during interro-
gation come within fifth amendment protection.
FAIR TRIAL
in their reporting of a trial are not subject to such legal limitations as
the hearsay rule, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and the best evidence rule. The trial court, however, must decide what
evidence to admit on the basis of these rules and must, presumably,
reach a decision solely on this evidence. Therefore, the public obtains
one view of what happened through the news media while the jury
at the trial gets another, probably different, view from the admissible
evidence." The juror may unknowingly view press accounts of a wit-
ness' testimony as independent evidence. When the same witness
testifies in court, the juror's belief in guilt initially created .by the
newspaper account may survive or color the evidence even though
this evidence has been properly presented at trial.9
When the news media conveyed uncontradicted and unsworn
evidence not subject to cross-examination to prospective jurors, the
"defendants were prejudged as guilty and the trial was but a legal
gesture to register a verdict already dictated by the press and the pub-
lic opinion which it generated." 10 The ideal embodied in the concept
of a fair trial is that the "conclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by
any outside influence whether of private talk or public print."'1 When
the press leads the community to believe the defendant is guilty by
publishing inadmissible evidence such as a coerced confession, the
results of a lie detector test or his record of prior convictions, what
is the remedy available to the accused? What recourse does the state
have?
CUSTOMARY REMEDIES
The remedies available may involve solely the right to a fair trial
in the face of adverse publicity. Where the right to a fair trial does
not involve direct action against the news media, the court may rule,
for example, that a change of venue should have been granted be-
cause of the prejudicial publicity. However, a remedy that penalizes
the one who disseminates information that denies a fair trial will lead
8 Goldfarb, Public Information, Criminal Trials and the Cause Celebre, 36 N.Y.U.L.-
REV. 810, 811 (1961).
9 Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity
on the juror's Ability to Be Impartial: A Plea for Reform, 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 672, 685
(1966).
10 Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 51 (1951) (separate opinion, Jackson, J.).
11 Attorney General ex rel. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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to a clash between first amendment, on one hand, and fifth, sixth, and
fourteenth amendment rights, on the other hand. Courts have been
understandably reluctant in exercising their contempt powers where
the courts must choose between competing constitutional values since
in the past first amendment values have been favored."2 The Supreme
Court nevertheless recognized that "There is also the conceded au-
thority of the courts to punish for contempt when publications di-
rectly tend to prevent the discharge of the judicial function. '1 3 Both
state and federal courts have favored the fair trial approach and have
reversed and remanded rather than suggesting that the culprit re-
sponsil)le for the denial of an impartial trial be directly attacked. The
courts' aversion to exercising their contempt power probably stems
from their awareness that the culprit is armed with a competing con-
stitutional right. Arguments such as "the reasonable alternatives avail-
able" or "the end can be more narrowly achieved without impinging
on constitutional rights" have been the vehicles for refusing to exer-
cise the contempt powers. 4
Sheppard v. Maxwell" represents the court's usual approach to
adverse publicity by the news media. The trial judge failed to control
disruFtive influences of news media in the courtroom; he failed to
protect the defendant from extensive inherently prejudicial press pub-
licity and publicized evidence which was never introduced or at-
tempted to be introduced at the trial; he failed to properly question
juror,: as to information obtained from outside sources; he exercised
poor supervision during jury sequestration; and he failed to insulate
witnesses and control release of information. The Court ordered a
new trial suggesting that because of prejudicial pre-trial publicity a
conti-uance or change of venue would have been in order and, be-
cause of unfair publicity during trial, a mistrial should have been
declared and a new trial ordered below. The main thrust of the opin-
ion was that the trial judge should have exercised controls within
his power.
These remedies, plus others suggested, may be helpful in eventually
leadiig to a fair trial for the accused, but they have their drawbacks.
A continuance, for instance, may conflict with the defendant's right
12 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331
(1946 1; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
1. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931).
14 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). 15 86 S.Ct. 1507 (1966).
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to a speedy trial guaranteed under the sixth amendment in federal
cases; witnesses will disappear; memories may fade; and the specter of
unfair publicity may rise again in renewed form to infect the post-
poned trial.
A change of venue, on the other hand, could deny the constitutional
right to a trial in the state or district where the crime was committed.
There could also be added expense in procuring and transporting
witnesses. Yet, in this day of extensive television, radio, and newspaper
coverage the adverse publicity might well follow into the next county.
There is no assurance that in granting mistrials and new trials un-
favorable publicity will not revive itself. Much of the trial judge's
attitude toward the guilt of the accused and much of his affinity to
publicity could be carried over with greater sublety into the new trial.
Voir dire with its accompanying challenges for cause may provide
an opportunity to remove a juror so exposed to publicity that he is
unable to render a fair verdict. This, however, has its limitations. If
the juror is aware of the influences and has no reservations in admitting
to them they will be uncovered. On the other hand, half forgotten
material within the juror's knowledge may seem too unimportant to
discuss; yet, it may be sufficient to change his vote when the jury
retires.16 As Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Maryland
v. Baltimore Radio Show said:
[I]t hardly seems necessary for the Court to say to men who are experienced
in the trial of jury cases, that every time Defense Counsel asked a prospective
juror whether he had heard a radio broadcast to the effect that his client con-
fessed to this crime or that he has been guilty of similar crimes, he would by
that act be driving one more nail into James' coffin. We think, therefore, that
remedy was useless. 17
If the juror indicates he is able to make his decision solely on the
evidence introduced in court, he is an impartial juror under the
sixth amendment. Where the judge denies a challenge for cause under
these circumstances, even though this juror admits that such pre-trial
publicity had caused him to form an opinion as to guilt, the denial
will stand. It is quite difficult for the defendant to set forth a pre-
sumption of the juror's partiality in such case. 8
Admonitions and cautionary instructions to the jury to decide on
16 Wright, A judge's View: The News Media and Criminal justice, 50 A.B.A.J. 1125,
1126 (1964).
17 338 U.S. 912, 916 (1950).
18 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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the evidence admissible in court and to ignore outside influences often
fail to accomplish any useful purpose. "The naive assumption that
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, . . .
all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction."1
Sequesi:ration of the jury can protect from the effects of publicity
during trial but not from pre-trial publicity. It is also distasteful to
the jurors, particularly during trials that are protracted, and should
generally be avoided except during deliberations.
Since i:he above solutions have little deterrent effect on the news
media and may have harmful effects on the defendant's case, as well
as the piosecution's, we must look elsewhere for effective solutions.
More effective solutions would involve sanctions against those who
possess information that can be passed on to the news media. Included
would be court employees, law enforcement officers, witnesses, coun-
sel for tl.e defense and prosecution and government employees. Sanc-
tions against those who gather and distribute the information that
might prejudice the trial would also be in order, but this would require
a recons.deration and reevaluation of important Supreme Court doc-
trine heretofore promulgated in this area.
CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION
Constructive contempt has not been the answer to date. In the
federal court system the interpretation of a statute2° limiting the power
of the federal courts to punish by contempt for misbehavior in the
presence of the court, "or so near thereto as to obstruct the adminis-
tration of justice," was for some time favorable to the contempt
power. In 1918 the Court upheld the district court judge's ruling,
finding i newspaper in contempt for publishing cartoons and editorials
in a contested rate case. The court relied on the test which looks to
"the reasonable tendency of the acts done to influence or bring about
the bakful result . . . without reference to the consideration of how
far they may have been without influence in a particular case."'" The
connection between the act done and obstruction to the administration
of justice was deemed "causal" and not "geographic."
19 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 553 (1949); to the same effect, see
Holtzoff, The Relation between the Right to a Fair Trial and the Right of Freedom of
the Press, 1 SYRAcusE L. REV. 369 (1950).
20 Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99 §§ 1, 4 Stat. 487 [substantially reenacted in 18 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1956)].
21 Tohdo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 421 (1918).
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However, in 1941, a majority of the Court, in a six to three decision,
said "so near thereto" means geographic nearness, 22 and plying the
plaintiff with liquor and furnishing him other inducement to dismiss
a civil case one hundred miles from the trial court was not a violation
of the statute. Thus, causal connection is no longer the primary
standard.
Significantly the Court rendered its first decision on the matter of
state court contempt power over publication the same year in Bridges
v. California.23 This was a five to four decision. Harry Bridges, a labor
leader, published a telegram he had sent to the Secretary of Labor
criticizing the decision of a state court judge and stating the decision
would lead to a strike. A contempt conviction resulted. The editor of
a newspaper was also found in contempt for publishing editorials
urging denial of probation to two labor leaders convicted of assault.
Juries were not involved. In Bridges a right to petition under the first
amendment was asserted and recognized. The Court held that the ill
effects of comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of
imminence high before utterances can be punished." 24 The Court did
not deny that there could be contempt by publication if particular
facts and circumstances showed it,25 but an examination of the facts
and circumstances convinced the majority that its standard had not
been met.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the dissent expressed the phi-
losophy of those who consider fair trial in the same hierarchy of values
as free speech:
But the Bill of Rights is not self-destructive. Freedom of expression can hardly
carry implications that nullify the guarantees of impartial trials, and since courts
are the ultimate resorts for vindicating the Bill of Rights, a state may surely
authorize appropriate historic means to assure that the process of such vindica-
ion be not wrenched from its rational tracks into the more primitive maleE of
passion and pressure. The need is great that courts be criticized but just as great
that they be allowed to do their duty.26
Frankfurter had confidence in the judicial use of the contempt
power. Their consciences, their high professional standards, their con-
cern for respect by lawyers and fellow judges, their concern for an-
other term, their knowledge of the ability of the appellate court to
nullify their action, as well as their knowing that the news media
22Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 47-53 (1941).
23 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 25 Id. at 271.
24 Id. at 263. 26 Id. at 284.
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could comment fully after completion of all judicial action would
cause judges to make judicious use of the contempt power."
The Court was unanimous in its next contempt by publication case
when it decided in Pennekamp v. Florida28 that newspaper criticism
of action already taken in dismissing certain indictments was not a
clear and present danger to Justice, the matter being pending in certain
respects. Tile Court emphasized that the comment concerned the
attitude of the judges regarding those under indictment and was not
comment regarding evidence and rulings during a jury trial. The
impact on jurors who might eventually try the cases was too remote. 9
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence was on the basis that the court had
already rendered its decision and the offending statements were criti-
cism of the decision and not attempts to influence it.8 ° Had Justice
Frankfurter deemed the matter pending, he would have held that
"the rights to undermine proceedings in court is not a prerogative of
the press."81
A divided court in Craig v. Harney2 found that newspaper com-
ment that attacked an elected layman judge while a motion for new
trial was pending in a civil case did not present "an imminent, not
merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice."8 " Thus, for
all practical purposes the clear and present danger test brings the same
results in state courts as the federal contempt statute brings in the
federal courts.
In Wood v. Georgia,4 a five to two decision, an elected judge
charged the grand jury with investigating block voting by Negroes
and political corruption in the purchase of their votes. The elected
sheriff issued a press statement criticizing the judge's charge. He was
found guilty of contempt, the lower court stating, without reasons or
findings, that the sheriff's statements constituted a "clear, present, and
imminent danger" to the administration of justice. The Supreme
Court, while not denying the principles of Bridges, Pennekamp, and
Harney, was able to distinguish them. The Court's conclusion was not
that the statements did not constitute a "clear and present danger"
but that they "did not present a [any] danger [whatsoever] to the
27 Id. at 304. 31 Id. at 364.
28 328 U.S. 331 (1946). 12331 U.S. 367 (1947).
29 Id. at 348. a33 Id. at 376.
3 Ild. at 369. 34 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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administration of justice .... -35 The Court's decision rested in large
part on the lack of reasons and findings; "[the lower court] simply
adopted as conclusions of law the allegations made in the contempt
citation." 6 In a dictum the Court went out of its way to distinguish
this case from cases where the court's contempt power might seem-
ingly be felt:
[T]his case does not present a situation where an individual is on trial: there
was no "judicial proceeding pending" in the sense that prejudice might result to
one litigant or the other .... Moreover, we need not pause here to consider the
variant factors that would be present in a case involving a petit jury. Neither
Bridges, Pennekanmp nor Harney involved a trial by jury. In Bridges it was
noted that "trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the
meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper" .. . and of course the limitations on
free speech assume a different proportion when expression is directed to a trial
as compared to a grand jury investigation. Rather, the grand jury was conduct-
ing a general investigation into a matter touching each member of the commu-
nity.3 7
After reading Bridges, Pennekamp, and Harney one could assume
that a trial could be pending virtually from the filing of a complaint
in a civil suit or arrest of the accused in a criminal matter all the way
through appeal as long as there is any decision along the way that
may be influenced by publication.3 In Wood the Court might be
opening the door to redefining and limiting what is "pending" and
what is a "trial" so as to deny the clear and present danger test, at
least in jury trials. On the other hand, the implication could be that
where a trial is pending prejudicial publicity could present a clear and
present danger to a defendant's right to a fair trial. Again, in Wood
political issues were being threshed out by elected officials opposing
each other in a coming election. All of the electorate had an interest
in the matters being discussed. Open criticism and discussion at the
heart of the political processes should stand high in the hierarchy of
values. The speech here concerning the governing process can be
distinguished from the speech in Bridges, Pennekamp, and Harney
which was divorced from free expression in political matters. "The
right to speak is the individualized legal reflection of the more general-
ized right to hear, which is basic to the process of political flux." 39
35 Id. at 395. 37 Id. at 389-90.
361d. at 387. 3 8 Note, 59 YALE L.J. 534 (1950).
39 FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 81 (1961).
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The fair trial approach, aside from any penalty to the disseminator
of prejudicial publicity, has moved in the direction of greater liberality
to the accused. The evolution of the cases involving this fair trial
approach stressed the issue of whether the newspaper accounts aroused
such prejudice that the trial lacked fundamental fairness rather than
the issue concerning the permissible scope of news media comment.
In Stroble v. California,4° petitioner claimed he was denied a fair trial
because of inflammatory newspaper accounts laid at the door of the
district attorney. The Court found there had been no motion for a
change of venue. The jurors on voir dire said they would presume
his innocence. Last, but not least, the petitioner failed by affidavit,
or otherwise, to show that newspaper accounts aroused such preju-
dicial publicity as to deny him a fair trial." Here the burden was on
the accused to show prejudicial publicity; a burden he would find
very difficult to meet.
In Marshall v. United States42 the Supreme Court used its super-
visory power with reference to devising proper standards for criminal
law enforcement in the federal courts to grant a new trial. The jurors
on voir dire had insisted they would not be influenced by news stories
of defendant's past convictions. In granting a new trial the Court
recognized the lack of protective procedures when prejudicial ac-
counts reached jurors through outside sources.4
In Irvin v. Dowd44 the accused's parole violation and previous
criminal record were published. The news media said he had been
identified at the police line-up and that he had refused at first to confess
and later confessed. The Court granted that the burden of showing the
juror's partiality was on the challenger. Preconceived opinions do not
disqualify, it being sufficient if the juror is able to ignore his opinion
and render a verdict on evidence produced in open court. The Court
then said it was the duty of the Court of Appeals to evaluate the
voire dire testimony of the jurors. It then found that the defendant
had not been accorded a fair trial by an impartial jury.4' Here, for the
first time, the Court reversed a state court decision solely because of
40 343 U.S. 181 (1952). 4 3Id. at 312-313.
41 Id. at 193. 44 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
42 360 U.S. 310 (1959). 45 Id. at 722-23.
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the harmful influence of pretrial publicity, a "pattern of deep and
bitter hostility" being shown on voir dire examination.4"
The Court, however, reached an opposite conclusion in Beck v.
Washington.4 7 Beck claimed intensive and voluminous unfavorable
publicity had violated his due process rights to a fair trial. Yet, there
had been no challenge of any of the jurors for cause. The Court found
the accused had failed to sustain the burden of showing essential un-
fairness "as a demonstrable reality. 4
8
Television, with its "intimacy and immediacy," in becoming the
primary source of news to the American public49 presented new facets
of influence that the Court met head-on in Rideau v. Louisiana.50
There, after a bank was robbed, three employees kidnapped, and one
person killed, a twenty minute filmed interview between the accused
and the sheriff was televised three times in the area. The interview was
basically a confession by the accused to the robbery, kidnapping, and
murder. At arraignment a request for a change of venue was denied.
The Court did not concern itself with examination of the voir dire
transcript nor with the question whether the confession was admissible
or even offered in evidence. It did not place the burden on the accused
to show prejudice. The filmed televised interview by itself was suffi-
cient to call for reversal without showing how the jurors were affected
or whether any jurors were affected. The Court said:
Under our Constitution's guarantee of due process, a person accused of com-
mitting a crime is vouchsafed basic minimal rights. Among these are the right to
counsel, the right to plead not guilty, and the right to be tried in a courtroom
presided over by a judge. Yet in this case the people of Calcasieu Parish saw and
heard not once but three times, a "trial" of Rideau in fact presided over by a
sheriff, where there was no lawyer to advise Rideau of his right to remain
mute.
51
Here for the first time the Court recognized that pre-trial publicity
in and of itself could so infect the trial as to leave it no more than a
formality calling for a verdict of guilt. Showing of a nexus between
the televised confession and trial was not necessary. "Ordeal by pub-
licity, the legitimate great-grandchild of ordeal by fire, water, and
4 6Id. at 727. 47 369 U.S. 541 (1962). 481d. at 558.
49 Daly, Ensuring Fair Trials and a Free Press for the Press and Bar Alike, 50 A.B.A.J.
1037, 1039 (1964).
50 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
51 Id. at 726-27.
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battle serves no legitimate function here in the search for truth."5 2
Estes v. Texas53 involved the question of whether televising part of
the proceedings in a state criminal case over the defendant's objection
violated his due process right to a fair trial. No question was involved
here of violation of the Canons of Ethics, first amendment rights,
prejudicial publicity or admission of evidence. The main thrust of
the Court's opinion was that television would not contribute to the
search for truth but would distract the parties, the lawyers, the wit-
nesses, and the judge, thereby prejudicing the defendant's case, lessen-
ing the reliability of his trial and denying him a fair trial as required
by due process. "[O]nly where the public interest really dictates
should any party to the judicial process become a party to the pub-
licity process as well. 5 4
CHANGING VALUES
It is submitted that the scales have shifted from superiority of first
amendment rights to an equilibrium between first amendment rights
on one hand and sixth amendment rights and due process on the other
hand so that action penalizing prejudicial publicity whether it orig-
inates with lawyers, prosecutors, enforcement officers, or the press
is in order.
The concept of the guarantee of a public trial as a reenforcement
to free press rights was negatived by Mr. Chief Justice Warren when
he said in his concurring opinion in Estes, "But the guarantee of a
public trial confers no special benefits on the press, the radio industry
or the television industry."55 Mr. Justice Harlan in the same case said
"[A] reporter's constitutional rights are no greater than those of any
other member of the public."5 6 The purpose of public trials is not to
entertain or instruct but to eliminate secret trials.5 ' When the trial
judge ordered the general public and the press from the courtroom in
the interests of "good morals" and "sound administration of justice"
the United Press in United Press Ass'n v. Valente" brought an action
52 Boldt, Should Canon 35 Be Amended? A Federal Judge Answers No, 41 A.B.A.J.
55 (1955).
53 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
54 Wessel, Controlling Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Cases, 48 J.AM.JUD. SocY.
105, 107 (1964).
55 381 U.S. at 583. 56 Id. at 589.
57 Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840, 842 (1960).
5r8 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
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to restrain the judge from giving effect to his decision. On appeal it
was held that the freedom of the press was not abridged and that the
judge's ruling "did not deprive petitioners of any right or privilege
of which they may complain."5" The right to a public trial has the
primary purpose of giving the accused the greater degree of fairness
that is inherent in public proceedings as opposed to star chamber
proceedings.
Since Bridges, Penekamp, and Harney6° fair trial has been re-
enforced by holdings that sixth amendment rights to confront and
cross-examine witnesses in criminal cases61 and the right to counsel62
are made obligatory on the states by reason of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
While, initially, coerced confessions were inadmissible because they
were deemed untrustworthy, confessions now are rejected because
the Court disapproves of police methods used and therefore penalizes
the law enforcement officers by denying their hard work any consid-
eration.63 Likewise, sanctions are now applied where evidence is il-
legally seized by refusing to admit the illegally seized material into
evidence or reversing a conviction if such evidence has been ad-
mitted."4 This supplements other remedies such as trespass, civil rights
suits, breaking and entering and assault actions brought against the
offending police.
The Court has been paying more than lip service to Justice Frank-
furter's dictum that "not the least significant test of the quality of a
civilization is its treatment of those charged with crimes particularly
with offenses which arouse the passions of a community."6 5 For
example, recognition of indigents' rights66 and liberalization of federal
habeas corpus6 7 have affirmed a philosophy of expanded protection
to the accused in criminal cases.
59 Id. at 77, 123 N.E.2d at 777.
60 Cases cited note 12 supra.
61 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
62 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
63 Supra note 7.
64 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
65 Supra note 44, at 729 (concurring opinion).
66 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
67 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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THE DECLINE OF THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER DOCTRINE
The Court has carved out specific exceptions to first amendment
protection since Bridges, Penekamp, and Harney. Incitement to action
for the forcible overthrow of government,6 8 utterances of a libelous
nature,69 incitement to riot,"° and obscene speech and press7 ' have no
redeeming social value and are denied first amendment protection.
The decline of the clear and present danger test with its embellish-
ing preferred position argument weakens the underpinnings of the
cases which denied contempt by publication. The clear and present
danger test had significant strength solely from 1937 to 1951. Then it
was always a divided court that applied the doctrine.7 2 There were
many situations where the Court could have utilized the doctrine
during that period, but it did so only nine times.7 3 Three of the cases
involved contempt by publication. 74 Two were flag salute cases with
religious freedom of major concern.7 5 Two involved picketing.7 6 One
concerned soliciting membership in a union.77 One decided the matter
of the conviction of a communist organizer under a state syndicalism
act.
78
The clear and present danger doctrine has been abandoned in
picketing cases and now "state courts and legislatures are free to de-
cide whether to permit or suppress any particular picket line for any
reason other than a blanket policy against all picketing. ' '7 9 In Cox v.
Louisiana° demonstrations before the courthouse to protest the arrest
68 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
69 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
70 Fiener v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
71 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
72 Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From Schenek to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
313, 320 (1952): "The clear and present danger test has never had more than four con-
sistent supporters sitting as members of the Court at any one time."
73 McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182, 1207 (1959).
74 Cases cited note 12 supra.
75 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Taylor v.
Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
76 Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
77 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
78 Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
79 International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695, A.F.L., v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284, 297 (1957) (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
80 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
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of students incarcerated in the building were not protected in the face
of a narrowly drawn statute designed to prohibit such conduct. The
Court said that "judges are human; and the legislature has the right to
recognize the danger that some judges, jurors, and other court officials
will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in
or near their courtrooms prior to or at the time of trial. ' 81 Further
the Court rejected appellant's clear and present danger argument and
said "we deal ... not with speech in its pristine form but conduct of
a different character."' 82
The clear and present danger doctrine underwent modification in
Dennis v. United States.83 The test that emerged was "In each case
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary
to avoid the danger."84 With "immincence" eliminated, the test takes
on a "reasonable" approach. The test may now be one of "clearness
and probability" with balancing brought in and preference for the
first amendment taken out. The doctrine was not for many years the
basis for an important opinion either in its original or in its modified
form.8 ,
Mr. Justice Jackson's concurrence in Dennis suggests the abandon-
ment of the clear and present danger test in the more serious cases.
His suggestion is:
[S]ave it ... for application as a "rule of reason" in the kind of case for which
it was devised. When the issue is criminality of a hot headed speech on a street
corner, or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or parading by some zeal-
ots behind a red flag, it is not beyond the judicial process to gather, comprehend,
and weigh the necessary materials for decision whether it is a clear and present
danger of substantial evil or a harmless letting off of steam.86
Over the past several years the Court, while not specifically reject-
ing the clear and present danger doctrine, has either ignored it, found
reasons for not applying it or paid it no more than lip service in cases
of consequence. In determining whether first amendment rights have
been violated, the Court has been prone to balance those rights against
important state interests. It balanced self preservation against personal
liberties;8 7 it balanced the state's interest in keeping those advocating
81 Id. at 565. 84 Id. at 510.
82 Id. at 566. 85 McKay, supra note 73, at 1209.
83341 U.S. 494 (1951). 86 Supra note 83, at 568.
87 Communist Party of America v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1
(1961).
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violent overthrow from becoming attorneys against the deterrent
effect that compelled disclosure would have on free speech and asso-
ciation;88 it balanced public interests in the results of congressional
investigations against private interests in remaining silent and found
the subordinating interest of the government compelling;8 9 it weighed
public interest in membership lists against private associational rights
and found no such compelling interest that would outweigh private
rights. °
Now the Court could balance constitutional values and rights and
find in the individual case that the accused's right to a fair trial and
the public interest in the proper administration of justice outweigh
the newspaper's right to publish prejudicial information. It could find
that publication of such information presents a clear and present dan-
ger to the defendant's right to a fair trial. Wood v. Georgia91 in find-
ing no danger (rather than no clear and present danger) to the ad-
ministration of justice92 and in emphasizing that an individual was not
on trial, that a judicial proceeding where prejudice could result to
an individual was not pending, and that a petit jury was not in-
volved93 left open the question of sanctions for those who publish
prejudicial material while the adversary system is working and a trial
is in progress.
The Court's liberal faction very well might be torn between sup-
porting "free press" or "fair trial." This might leave determination of
the ultimate value to the conservative faction. In Baltimore Radio
Show v. Maryland,14 the Maryland Civil Liberties Committee favored
a fair trial while the American Civil Liberties Union favored the rights
of a free press.
One detects not only an appreciation of the high value of a fair trial
but also an intimation that this is a preferred freedom when the Court
says, as it did in Estes: "We have always held that the atmosphere
essential to a fair trial-the most fundamental of all freedoms-must
be maintained at all costs."9 5
In Sheppard v. Maxwell" Mr. Justice Clark encouraged those who
88 Konigsberg v. State of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
89 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
90 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
91 Supra note 34, at 375. 92 Id. at 395. 93 Id. at 389.
9 4 Brief for Appellant, p. 54, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949).
05 381 U.S. at 540. 96 Supra note 15.
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could control the release of prejudicial information to do so. He
suggested the Court had power to prohibit participants in the trial
from making extra-judicial statements that might be prejudicial. He
also suggested the promulgation of regulations by government officials
prohibiting release of information concerning the case by their em-
ployees as well as warnings to reporters writing material harmful to
the defendant's case. 7 Impliedly, along with the warning to newsmen,
some type of disciplinary action would be in order. When he said:
"Collaboration between counsel and press . . . affecting the fairness
of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly cen-
surable and worthy of disciplinary measures. ' 9 8 Did he mean the press
could be disciplined? If so, the attitude of some members of the news
media, i.e., "We may or may not believe what we say, but we'll de-
fend to your death our right to say it," may be on the way out.
REMEDIES SUGGESTED
Remedies suggested to secure a fair trial in the face of adverse com-
ment and publicity have been legion. Among solutions that might
furnish partial answers to the problem we find the following: the blue
ribbon jury permitted under Fay v. New York,99 giving to the de-
fendant the sole discretion to waive jury trial in criminal cases;100
allowing the judge to take the case from the jury when the jury can
no longer be impartial due to outside influences (revisions in most con-
stitutions would be required here); keeping the records of a criminal
case secret, and allowing the defendant to have a secret trial.' Deny-
ing admission to the trial to the public generally, including the news
media, has been held not to violate press freedom.0 2 Exclusion is thus
able to minimize adverse comment during trial. A statute authorizes
a damage suit against the author, printer, or publisher of any publica-
tion that improperly tends to bias the minds of the public, court, offi-
cers, witnesses, or jurors on any question pending before the court. 10 3
The main thrust, however, of the proposals has been directed
toward controlling and disciplining participants in the trial and gov-
ernment employees. The Department of Justice has established guide-
lines for the release of information to the news media that govern
971d. at 1521-22. 9 8 1d. at 1522. 99 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
100 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930). 101 Supra note 8, at 822-834.
102 United Press Ass'n v. Valente, supra note 58, at 77, 123 N.E.2d at 778.
103 Act of June 16, 1836, P.L. 784, § 27, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, § 2045 (Purdon, 1962).
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from the time of arrest until termination of the proceeding. Observa-
tions about a defendant's character, admissions made by him, reference
to investigative procedures, information regarding witnesses, and
statements concerning evidence or arguments cannot be released. 04
Presumably reprimand or dismissal of the employee would be the
means of enforcement.
A bill introduced as a proposed new section to the Federal Criminal
Code makes it a contempt of court punishable by fine for any federal
employee, a defendant or his attorney to "promise or make available
for publication information not already properly filed with the court
which might affect the outcome of any pending criminal litigation,
except evidence that has already been admitted at the trial."1 5
The New Jersey Court has interpreted Canon 20 of the American
Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics to ban public state-
ments by the prosecution's staff as to admissions, or such remarks as
the case is "open and shut," or setting forth the accused's criminal
record. 106 Lethargy in giving force and effect to the canon has robbed
it of much of its potential efficacy.
Mr. Justice Clark said: "The courts must take such steps by rule
or regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside
influences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, wit-
nesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the juris-
diction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its functions.' '10 7
The government and the courts would seem to have ample authority
to prevent employees and those who are part of the proceedings from
revealing prejudicial information. The more difficult problem is con-
trol of the news media.
The federal courts are on record against photographing, televising,
and broadcasting while judicial proceedings are in progress. 108
Voluntary cooperation on the part of the news media in withhold-
104 28 O.F.R. § 50.2 (1966). 105 S.2290, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
100 State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964): Canon 20 states: Newspaper
publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a
fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice. Gen-
erally, they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case
justify a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex
parte reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers
on file with the Court; but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte
statement. [Italics omitted.]
107 Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra note 15, at 1522.
108 RULE 53, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ANNUAL REPORT THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, (March 8-9, 1962) 10.
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ing prejudicial information and criticism has not been the answer.
The news gathering agencies have indicated an unwillingness to sub-
mit to a code which will furnish operating standards.' 09 The press is
not an organized profession capable of applying sanctions or expul-
sion of offending members. The news media cater to a large variety
of reading, viewing, and listening audiences. Competition is ever
present with the competitor exercising the least restraint too often
getting the greater circulation."°
It is submitted that the time is ripe for a narrowly drawn contempt
statute that would apply to employees of news media as well as pros-
ecutors and defense counsel and their staffs, the accused, subpoenaed
witnesses, enforcement officers, and government officers and employ-
ees. The Attorney General's Statement of Policy"' could furnish the
direction for such a criminal contempt statute which would delineate
specific types of punishable publication. Any person in the above
categories responsible for the publication would be subject to crim-
inal contempt proceedings with the punishment including at least a
fine.
The following would be prohibited: (1) Observations about the
accused's character and derogatory descriptions of him, such as "mad
dog killer"; (2) The existence of statements and confessions attrib-
utable to the defendant as well as the statement and confession; (3)
Reference to investigative procedures such as ballistics tests; (4)
Statements regarding the identity, testimony or credibility of prospec-
tive witnesses (5) Statements concerning evidence or arguments in
the case; (6) Comment intended to influence judge or jury or criti-
cism of judge or jury; (7) Expressions of opinion regarding guilt or
innocence; (8) The prior criminal record of the accused; (9) Ref-
erence to tangible evidence seized from the accused during a search
or arrest; (10) Revealing the names and addresses of jurors if the jury
has not been sequestered." 2
The above publications would fall within the penalized class in a
109 THE PREss-BAR COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS RE-
PORT OF 9 (April 14, 1965) said in part: "We are persuaded that no set of specific rules
can be written into a code of press conduct that will not do more harm than good ..
See also FELSHER & ROSEN, THE PRESS IN THE JURY Box (1966).
110 Taylor, The Ditchley Papers, Crime Reporting and Publicity of Criminal Pro-
ceedings, 66 CoLuM.L. REV. 34, 54 (1966).
"' Supra note 104.
112 See Will, Free Press v. Fair Trial, 12 DE PAUL L. REV. 197, 215 (1963): Judge Will
would have two broad categories into which would fit various types of prejudicial
matter, material which per se is a clear and present danger to the administration of
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criminal case from the time of the arrest of the accused until the
verdict of the jury, judgment of the court, or their admission into
evidence. They would not encompass Bridges where criticism was
made while motions for new trial and sentencing after verdict were
pending. They would not encompass Pennekamp where indictments
were dismissed and criticism was directed at the judge's dismissal.
They would not encompass Harney where criticism took place in a
civil suit at a time a motion for a new trial was pending. They would
not encompass Wood where the judge's motives in charging a grand
jury were questioned and the accusatory finger of the grand jury had
not, as yet, pointed at anyone.
The contempt statute would apply in both bench trials and jury
trials. While it is true that judges are better qualified to sift evidence,
it is also true that judges have aspirations for re-election and for higher
office. Judges are human and can be influenced by the concerted
action of the powerful news media. If the statute covered only jury
trials, there might be subtle influences brought to bear on the accused
to waive his right to a jury trial. Those who desired to violate the
statute might gamble on whether the accused would waive. The pub-
lication itself should call for a sanction and should not depend upon
whether judge or jury heard the case.
The contempt should be heard by the judge who conducted the
trial. He should initiate the proceedings since he would, in most in-
stances, be at odds with the press for its having knowingly violated
the statute. Thus, there is less chance of his decision being influenced
by the concerted action of the news media. A statute calling for in-
formation or indictment with the Grand Jury and the District Attor-
ney involved would, on the other hand, not be satisfactory. Members
of the Grand Jury itself might have been influenced by the original
prejudicial material. The District Attorney often exercises consider-
able influence over the Grand Jurors and the District Attorney, as
an elected official, would not care to antagonize the news media.
More importantly, it is not uncommon that the prejudicial material
comes from the district attorney's office or from the law enforcement
section with which he is closely allied. Of course, in the contempt
proceedings a full hearing should be had on the record with right to
counsel and right to appeal.
criminal justice and material which a jury may find is a serious and imminent threat to
the administration of criminal justice.
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In December of 1966 the American Bar Association's Committee
on Free Press and Fair Trial issued a tentative draft as part of a project
relating to minimum standards for criminal justice.11 3 No substantial
quarrel can be had with the Committee's recommendations relating
to the conduct of attorneys, law enforcement officers, judicial em-
ployees, and judicial proceedings in criminal cases in this area of "free
press." '114 It is, however, questionable whether its recommendation
restricting the contempt powers of judges goes far enough to insure
a fair trial. Judges may cite the press for contempt only in criminal
cases and then only where the press publishes material outside of the
court's public record. It is further restricted to circumstances where
"the statement is reasonably calculated to affect the outcome of the
trial and seriously threatens to have such an effect."1 5 In addition, it is
necessary that the restricted material must be published during the
period beginning with the selection of the jury and ending with a
verdict of judgment. Thus, the report would give the news media a
relatively free hand during pre-trial periods. Only if the publication
violated a valid judicial order not to disseminate specified protected
information could the press be held in contempt for what transpired
prior to the trial. A judge sitting without a jury, specifically, could
not punish those who "disseminate information by means of public
communication" in a way prejudicial to the defendant. The statements
published during a jury trial must be either actually intended to affect
the outcome of the trial or it must appear that they were so likely to
affect the outcome that the persons making them could have acted
only with reckless disregard of the results. Under ABA proposed
standards, it isn't sufficient that the statements would be reasonably
calculated to have the effect. There must have been a clear and present
danger that the evil sought to be prevented would occur." 6
The real danger to a fair trial is in prejudicial publication. That
which is reprehensible with regard to an attorney, a law enforcement
officer, or a judicial employee making prejudicial information avail-
able from the time the defendant is arrested or indicted should be
equally reprehensible when the same information is published, even if
prior to the trial, even if there is no specific intent or reckless dis-
regard, even if a "clear and present danger" is not present, and even
if it is a trial without a jury.
113 ABA, ABA STANDARDS RELATING To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Tent. Draft,
1966).
114 Id. at 2-14. 115Id. at 14-15. 116 Id. at 68-73 and 150-54.
